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ABSTRACT
The Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI) is the most common way to measure the
importance of public support for Development Finance Institutions (DFIs). We present
the SDI and show its equivalence to a subsidy-adjusted measure of return on equity.
We then review recent attempts to adjust the SDI. As a whole, the recent measures are
either meaningless or answer unimportant questions. Their use does not lead to a
better understanding of the social cost of a DFI.
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THE SUBSIDY DEPENDENCE INDEX
AND RECENT ATTEMPTS TO ADJUST IT

1. Introduction
For decades, governments and donors have tried to improve social welfare
through public support for development finance institutions (DFIs). As with all projects
that use public funds, subsidized DFIs are worthwhile in principle as long as their
social benefits exceed their social costs. In practice, however, the measurement of social
benefits is so complex and thus so expensive that policymakers cannot expect to gain
from a full-blown social cost-benefit analysis each time that they must choose whether
to spend public funds on support for a DFI or on other ways to help the poor such as
improved health care or schools. A less-expensive alternative is a simple measure of
social cost. We define social cost as the opportunity cost to society of the public funds
used by a DFI less what the DFI could pay back to society and still break even in a
given time frame. A DFI with no social cost is subsidy independent.
The Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI) (Yaron, 1992a and 1992b) measures the
social cost of subsidized DFIs in short time frames such as a year. The SDI is useful
since it puts a price tag on the development finance produced by a DFI. Government
and donors should know this price since funds earmarked for development are scarce.
Subsidies for DFIs are not bad unless they could improve social welfare more elsewhere.
The measurement of cost is the first step in the wise use of public funds.
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The measurement of performance as opportunity cost less profit was proposed
long ago as a way to assess not-for-profit hospitals (Jennings, 1993; Wheeler and
Clement, 1990; Silvers and Kauer, 1986; Pauly, 1986; Conrad, 1986 and 1984). Forprofit firms also use the technique. “Lost in ever darker muddles of accounting” (Tully,
1993), these firms have turned more and more to measures based on opportunity costs.
Shareholders know that return on equity (ROE) does not always give a full answer to
their question of whether a firm is a good investment. Just as accounting profit and
ROE do not tell owners whether a firm creates or destroys private wealth, these
common measures do not tell society whether a DFI creates or destroys social welfare.
In this paper, we present the SDI and show its equivalence to a subsidy-adjusted
measure of ROE. We then review three recent attempts to adjust the SDI: the Subsidy
Dependence Ratio of Khandker, Khalily, and Khan (1995); the Profitability Gap of
Sacay (1996); and the SDI of Hulme and Mosley (1996). We make explicit the questions
answered by these measures. We argue that the new measures are not useful for the
analysis of the performance of subsidized DFIs since the SDI gives a better answer to a
more useful question.
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2. The Subsidy Dependence Index
The SDI is the ratio of subsidy to revenue from lending (Yaron, 1992a and
1992b). In its focus on opportunity costs instead of prices paid, the SDI is like standard
tools of project analysis that answer questions asked by society. Like all yardsticks, the
SDI is only as good as its data and assumptions. It serves to carve benchmarks, to
track trends, and to compare a DFI with peers. The SDI skips half the story—it
measures costs but not benefits. It is much less expensive, however, to measure costs
than to measure benefits. Knowledge of costs can improve the use of funds a lot even
when benefits are unknown. Even if benefits were known, they would still have to be
compared with costs.
The SDI is useful inasmuch as government and donors care about the
counterfactual question that it answers. The SDI tells the percentage change in the
yield on lending that, all else constant, would allow the DFI to compensate society for
the use of public funds and still break even in a short time frame such as a year. The
SDI quantifies the matching-grant element in loans from DFIs. It tells how much
subsidy society gave the DFI for each dollar of revenue collected from borrowers.
The most common way for donors, governments, and DFIs to gauge performance
is a two-pronged framework of social cost as subsidy and of social worth as outreach
(Gonzalez-Vega, et al., 1997; Khandker, 1996; Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega, 1996;
Christen, et al., 1995; Benjamin, 1994; Yaron, 1994 and 1992a). Outreach is the social
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worth of the output of a DFI in terms of six aspects—depth, worth to users, cost to
users, breadth, length, and scope—in a standard framework for project analysis
(Schreiner, 1998).

2.1 Subsidy in the SDI
We highlight the economic logic of the SDI by expressing it in terms of flows of
subsidized funds.1 We also show that the SDI does not depend on the specific form in
which the DFI receives subsidized funds.
A DFI gets subsidies from the use of subsidized funds. Subsidized funds are
public funds from government or donors and come in six forms (Table 1 on page 36).
Three are equity grants that increase net worth but do not directly change the
accounting profit reported in the year received. The other three are profit grants that
do directly increase the accounting profit reported in the year received since they inflate
revenues and/or deflate expenses. This increases retained earnings at year-end and thus
increases net worth. Compared with the case without the grant, all six forms of
subsidized funds increase net worth one-for-one. All six forms have the same social
opportunity cost. As in Yaron (1992b), we ignore dividends and taxes on profits for
simplicity.

1

This section is based on Schreiner (1997).
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2.1.1 Equity grants
The first two forms of subsidized funds are equity grants EG. These cash gifts
increase net worth but do not change accounting profit directly. Equity grants are the
sum of direct grants DG and paid-in capital PC:
Equity grants ' Direct grants % Paid&in capital ,
EG ' DG % PC .

(1)

Direct grants DG are cash gifts. Direct grants increase net worth, but they do
not pass through the income statement, and hence they do not inflate accounting profit.
Direct grants include both gifts in cash and gifts in kind such as computers or trucks
that are recorded in the accounts.
Paid-in capital PC comes from sales of shares to donors or government. Such a
sale is like a direct grant since public funds pay for the shares. Furthermore, most
public entities do not act like private owners. We assume that all paid-in capital comes
from public sources.
2.1.2 Profit grants
Profit grants PG are the third through fifth forms of subsidized funds (Table 1
on page 36). Like all equity grants, all forms of profit grants increase net worth since
they inflate accounting profit or reduce accounting loss and wind up in net worth
through retained earnings at the end of the year.
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Profit grants distort accounting profit P and thus ROE since they depend on the
arbitrary choices made in practice by administrators and accountants. Donors can and
often do use profit grants to nudge accounting profit higher. In contrast, the SDI
recognizes the economic fact that a dollar treated as a profit grant has the same effect
on the business performance of a DFI as a dollar treated as an equity grant.
Profit grants are the sum of revenue grants RG, discounts on public debt
A@(m!c), and discounts on expenses DX:
Profit grants ' Rev. grants % Discount public debt % Discount on expenses,
(2)

PG ' RG % A @ (m ! c ) % DX .

Revenue grants RG are cash gifts. They are just like equity grants except for the
accounting choice to record them as revenue rather than as direct injections to equity.
Revenue grants increase net worth, but only after they pass through the income
statement and increase reported accounting profit. This is misleading since revenue
grants are not the product of business operations.
Discounts on public debt A@(m!c) and discounts on expenses DX are the fourth
and fifth forms of subsidized funds. They are non-cash gifts, expenses paid on behalf of
the DFI by someone else. Discounts increase the cash held by the DFI since they
decrease the cash spent by the DFI.
The discount on public debt A@(m!c) is the opportunity cost of public debt less
what the DFI paid, where A is average public debt, c is the rate paid by the DFI, and
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m is the opportunity cost of public debt for society:
Discount public debt ' Ave. public debt @ ( Opp. cost public debt ! Rate paid ) ,
'

Astart % A end
2

@ m !

Expense interest for public debt
,
Astart %A end
(3)
2

' A @ ( m ! c) .

Discounts on public debt are subsidized funds that inflate profit and boost net
worth since they cut expenses. Public debt is like private debt linked to a grant of
A@(m!c) (Inter-American Development Bank, 1994). Unlike the discount on public debt
A@(m!c), public debt A itself does not increase net worth directly.
Discounts on expenses DX are costs absorbed by government or donors that the
DFI does not record as expenses. Classic examples are technical assistance, free deposit
insurance, coverage of organization costs or feasibility studies, debt guarantees,
consultant services, classes for loan officers, and travel for employees.
2.1.3 True profit
True profit TP, a non-cash equity grant, is the sixth form of subsidized funds
(Table 1 on page 36). It is accounting profit P less profit grants (equation 2 on page 6):
True profit ' Accounting profit ! Profit grants ,
TP ' P ![ RG % A @ (m ! c )% DX ] .

(4)

All else constant, true profit is the change in retained earnings that would
obtain in the absence of profit grants. Positive true profits are a benefit since society
7

could withdraw them for use elsewhere. Negative true profits (true losses) are social
costs.
2.1.4 The formula of the SDI
Yaron (1992a) defines the SDI as the ratio of subsidy S to revenue from lending
LP@i, where LP is the average loan portfolio and i is the yield on lending:

SDI '

Subsidy
S
'
.
Revenue from lending
LP@ i

(5)

The SDI is the percentage change in the yield on lending (or, equivalently, in
revenue from lending) that, all else constant, would make subsidy zero. For example,
an SDI of 1.00 means that an increase in the yield of 100 percent would wipe out
subsidy and make the SDI zero. A negative SDI means that the DFI could compensate
society for its opportunity cost and still break even. It also means that a subsidyadjusted ROE would exceed the social opportunity cost.
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Yaron (1992a) defines the numerator of the SDI as subsidy S:
S ' m @ E% A @ ( m ! c) % K ! P ,

(6)

where
S ' Subsidy ,
m ' Opportunity cost of society ,
E ' Average equity ,
A ' Average public debt ,
c ' Rate paid for public debt ,
K ' Revenue grants and discounts on expenses , and
P ' Accounting profit .
K is the sum of revenue grants and discounts on expenses:
K ' RG % DX .

(7)

This explicit definition of K is useful since two recent proposed adjustments to
the SDI omit K from subsidy. Given K, subsidy S (equation 6 on page 8) can be seen as
the sum of the opportunity cost of the net worth of a DFI and of profit grants, less the
accounting profit available to compensate for this cost and still break even:
S ' m @ E % A @ (m !c ) % RG % DX ! P.

(8)

It is common practice to measure average stocks as half the sum of the start and
end stocks. In this case, average equity E is:

E '

E0 % E1
2

'

E0 % E0 % )E
2

9

' E0 %

)E
.
2

(9)

Change in equity )E is the sum of the flows of the six forms of subsidized funds:
)E ' Equity grants % Profit grants ,
' DG % PC % RG % A@ ( m ! c) % DX % TP .

(10)

To show the economic logic of the SDI, we rewrite subsidy S (equation 6 on page
8) using true profit (equation 4 on page 7), K (equation 7 on page 9), average equity E
(equation 9 on page 9), and the change in equity )E (equation 10 on page 9):
S ' m @ E % A @ ( m !c )% K ! P,
' m @ [ E0 % (1 /2 )@ (DG % PC %RG % A@ (m !c )% DX % TP) ]
%RG % A @ ( m ! c) % DX ![TP %RG % A @ ( m ! c) % DX ] ,

(11)

' m @ E0 % ( m / 2) @ [ DG% PC% RG % A@ ( m ! c) %DX %TP ] ! TP.
This formula shows the logic of the SDI in three terms. The first term, m@E0, is
the opportunity cost of subsidized funds used through the whole reported period. The
second term, (m/2)@[DG+PC+RG+A@(m!c)+DX+TP], is the opportunity cost of fresh
subsidized funds received in the course of a period. The third term, TP, is the true
profit earned by the DFI that could be used to compensate its owner—society—for the
use of its funds. Subsidy S is then unpaid cost less the ability to pay.
This formula also shows that the SDI does not depend on the form of subsidized
funds. All forms from past years in E0 cost m, and all forms of fresh funds cost (m/2).
An adjustment for subsidy due to exemption from reserve requirements is described in
Benjamin (1994) and Yaron (1992b).
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2.2 The SDI as a subsidy-adjusted ROE
The SDI is equivalent to a subsidy-adjusted ROE (SAROE) since the SDI is
negative if and only if an SAROE exceeds the social opportunity cost. The equivalence
is useful since ROE is the most common measure of the financial performance of a
private firm. Without tax, ROE compares accounting profit with average equity:

ROE '

Accounting profit
P
.
'
Average Equity
E

(12)

ROE uses accounting profits, and accounting profits depend on whether a gift is
treated as an equity grant or as a profit grant. A subsidy-adjusted ROE would
compare not accounting profit P but rather true profit TP with average equity E:

SAROE '

True profit
TP
.
'
Average Equity
E

(13)

A subsidy-adjusted measure of return on assets (SAROA) would replace equity
with assets in the denominator. To prove that a negative SDI implies an SAROE
higher than the social opportunity cost m and vice versa, we show first that subsidy is
the opportunity cost of equity less the true profit available to pay that opportunity
cost. This uses the detailed formula for subsidy (equation 11 on page 9) and the
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formula for the change in equity (equation 10 on page 9):
S ' m @ E0 % ( m / 2) @ [ DG% PC% RG % A@ ( m ! c) %DX %TP ] ! TP,
' m @ E0 % m @ ( 1/ 2) @ )E !TP ,

(14)

' m @ [ E0 % (1 /2 )@ )E] !TP ,
' m @ E ! TP .
We can now show that a negative SDI implies an SAROE above the social
opportunity cost:
S # 0 ] m @ E! TP # 0 ] m @ E # TP ] m #

TP
.
E

(15)

The SDI answers the same question as an SAROE. The SAROE is useful to
compare subsidized DFIs with peers. It is the standard way to benchmark the
performance of banks (Christen, 1997).

2.3 A numerical example
In this section, we use the formulas presented above to compute the SDI and an
SAROE for a mythical DFI.2
2.3.1 Example financial statements
In the balance sheet of the first year of the example DFI (Table 2 on page 37),
most assets were loans (lines Ad and Ag). Investments and fixed assets were modest.
Cash was 20 percent of assets. Half of liabilities were public debts, and half were

2

This section is based on Schreiner and Yaron (1998).
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deposits and private debt (lines Ah, Ai, and Aj). While public entities owned some
shares (line Al), most net worth came from direct grants (line Am). The example DFI
was highly subsidized.
The first-year income statement (Table 3 on page 38) shows that the DFI paid
25 in interest for its liabilities (line Bg), spent 600 in operating costs (line Bj), and did
not provide for loan losses (line Bi). Revenues from lending and investments were
420+5=425 (lines Ba, Bb, and Bc). Operating revenue less operating costs and financial
costs produced an operating margin of 425!(25+600)=-200 (line Bk). This would have
been more negative in the absence of the discount on expenses of 100 (line Bn). As it
was, this and a revenue grant of 400 (line Bl) let the example DFI boast an accounting
profit of 200 (line Bm).
If the gifts from discounts on expenses and revenue grants of 100+400=500 had
been called equity grants, then accounting profit would have been negative. Thus
measures that use accounting profit would hide the true performance of this subsidized
DFI. The accounting treatment of a gift does not change business performance and
thus should not change measures of business performance.
2.3.2 Rates of interest from the financial statements
Rates of interest are ratios of flows of revenues and expenses from the income
statement to average stocks from the balance sheet. The yield on lending i for the
example DFI in Year 01 is (420)/[(0+2,100)/2]=0.40 (line Cv of Table 4 of page 39).
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The interest rate paid on public debt was (10)/[(0+400)/2]=0.05 (line Cj). Given an
opportunity cost to society m of 10 percent per year (line Ck), the DFI would pay
(0.10)@[(0+400)/2]=20 for equivalent private debt. The discount on public debt is the
opportunity cost less what the DFI paid, 20-10=10 (line Cl). The interest rate paid on
deposits was (5)/[(0+200)/2]=0.05, and the interest rate paid on private debt was
(10)/[(0+200)/2]=0.10. The yield earned on investments j was (5)/[(0+200)/2]=0.05.
2.3.3 The SDI of the example DFI in Year 01
The SDI of the example DFI for Year 01 was 1.00 (line Cx of Table 4 on page
39). All else constant, an increase of 100 percent in the yield on lending would let the
DFI break even and still pay for the social cost of its funds.
The subsidy on equity is 1,100@0.10=110 (line Ce), the product of average equity
E of [(0+0+0)+(300+1,700+200)]/2=1,100 (line Cc) and opportunity cost of society m
of 10 percent (line Cd). The discount on public debt (line Cl) is [(0+400)/2]@(0.100.05)=10. This is the product of average public debt A (line Ch) and the opportunity
cost of society m (line Ck) less the rate paid c (line Cj). K (equation 7 on page 9) is
400+100=500 (line Co), the sum of revenue grants RG (line Cm) and discounts on
expenses DX (line Cn). Accounting profit P is 200 (line Cp). Finally, revenue from
lending LP@i is [(0+2,100)/2]@0.40=420 (line Cw), the product of the average loan
portfolio LP (line Ct) and the yield on lending i (line Cv).
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Thus the SDI for Year 01 is (equation 5 on page 8):

SDI01 '
'

S
m @ E % A @ ( m ! c) %K !P
'
,
LP@ i
LP@ i
0.10 @ 1,100 % 200@ (0.10 !0.05 )% 500 ! 200
,
1,050@ 0.40

(16)

' (110 % 10 %500 !200 )/ 420,
' 420/ 420 ' 1.00.
2.3.4 The meaning of the SDI in Year 01
All else constant, the SDI for Year 01 of 1.00 means that the DFI could
compensate society for the opportunity cost of the use of its funds and still break even
if revenue from lending increased by 100 percent. If the size of the loan portfolio is
unchanged, then this would require doubling the yield. In general,
Subsidy&free yield ' Actual yield@ (1 % SDI ) ,
' Actual yield% Change in yield.

(17)

The SDI is a relative measure of the change in the actual yield that would
compensate for subsidies. The actual yield varies through time and across DFIs. Also,
nominal yields vary with inflation. Good analysis will thus consider the absolute level
of subsidy S, the SDI, the actual yield i, the change in the yield i@SDI, and the subsidyfree yield i·(1+SDI) in real and nominal terms. In this example, the subsidy S is 420,
the SDI is 1.00, and the actual yield is 0.40 (line Cy). The change is 0.40@1.00=0.40
(line Cz), and the nominal subsidy-free yield is 0.40+0.40=0.80 (line Caa). With
inflation of 10 percent (line Cbb), the real subsidy-free yield was 64 percent (line Ccc).
15

2.3.5 The SAROE in Year 01
Accounting profit P was 200 (line Da of Table 5 on page 40), but true profit
TP—after deducting revenue grants RG of 400, discounts on public debt A@(m!c) of 10,
and discounts on expenses DX of 100—was -310 (line De). Average equity E was 1,100
(line Dh). The SAROE was thus -310/1,100Ñ-0.28 (line Do). All else constant, this
means that the DFI would have consumed about 28 percent of its average net worth
had it compensated society for the opportunity cost of the use of public funds. The
negative (and meaningful) SAROE stands in stark contrast to the positive (yet
meaningless) ROE (line Dn).

2.4 Strengths and limits of the SDI
The SDI has at least nine strengths. First, the SDI quantifies subsidy and shows
the extent of subsidy dependence. Often donors and governments do not know just how
much DFIs cost society. They need this knowledge to compare DFIs with other uses of
public funds. Second, the SDI compares subsidy with revenue from lending. This ratio
can be seen as a matching grant, the amount of subsidy S awarded to the DFI by
society for each dollar of interest LP@i paid by borrowers. Third, the SDI can track
subsidy dependence through time. A DFI may improve whether or not it can declare
complete subsidy independence. Fourth, a negative SDI implies an SAROE higher than
the opportunity cost of society. Fifth, the SDI shifts the paradigm from prices paid to
opportunity costs since prices paid are often distorted by subsidies. Sixth, the SDI
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highlights the possibility of covering costs with revenue from lending. Seventh, although
the SDI does not measure benefits, which is expensive, it does measure costs, which is
much less expensive. Eighth, the SDI is simple and well-known. Its use can induce a
disciplined approach to the judgement of the social costs of public support for DFIs.
Since the data needed should be easy to extract, the SDI can also help to detect
weaknesses in accounting systems. Ninth, the SDI can help in the analysis of the
sources and uses of subsidy (Yaron, 1992b, p. 24).
The SDI also has at least two limitations. Analysts should know them so that
they use the SDI only to answer the question that the SDI addresses. The SDI answers
an important question, but it does not claim to answer all important questions.
First, the SDI does not discount flows of funds. In short time frames, this is not
a material issue. In long time frames, however, measures of social cost must be based
explicitly on a framework that discounts flows of funds (Schreiner, 1997). Like private
investors who buy shares in firms, government and donors must judge DFIs not only in
their first year, in their most recent year, or in the next year, but also through their
whole lifetimes and into the future.
Second, the SDI measures subsidy independence but not private profitability.
Subsidy independence means that a DFI could pay society for the opportunity cost of
its funds and still break even in a period. In contrast, privately profitable means that a
DFI could maintain its real size even if it had to replace all public funds with funds
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from the market (Schreiner, 1997). The two concepts are not necessarily the same since
the opportunity cost of funds for society may differ from the market price of funds for a
DFI without public support.

18

3. Recent proposed changes to the SDI
The importance of a measure of the social cost of DFIs has prompted several
attempts to refine the SDI or to use other standards to judge performance. In this
section, we critique three recent proposals. They fix what is not broken, or they tweak
the SDI to answer unimportant questions.

3.1 The Subsidy Dependence Ratio of Khandker
In several papers about the performance of DFIs in Bangladesh, Khandker
proposes the Subsidy Dependence Ratio (SDR) as an alternative to the SDI (Khandker
and Khalily, 1996; Khandker, Khalily, and Khan [KK&K], 1995; Khandker, Khan, and
Khalily, 1995). Measures similar to the SDR have been proposed by Holtmann and
Mommartz (1996), SEEP (1995), and the Inter-American Development Bank (1994).
The main concern of these authors is that the SDI compares subsidy only with
revenue from lending even though DFIs also get revenue from investments in non-loan
assets such as treasury bills. In principle, a DFI could decrease its subsidy dependence
through increased revenues either from loans or from investments.
Thus the SDR suggests that subsidy be compared with revenue both from loans
and from investments. Fixing the fact that the SDR of KK&K omits K, if j is the yield
on investments and if I is the average investment, then the SDR is:

SDR '

S
.
LP@ i % I@ j

19

(18)

Both the SDR and the SDI have subsidy S in the numerator. Like the SDI, the
SDR is negative if and only if an SAROE exceeds the social opportunity cost. Thus the
SDR and the SDI do not differ in their most important aspect, the measurement of
subsidy. They do differ, however, in what they compare with subsidy.
3.1.1 What question does the SDR answer?
The SDR answers the question: How much more revenue from loans and
investments would be needed to reach subsidy independence? The meta-question is
whether this a useful question.
The SDR does not answer a useful question. While most DFIs have some degree
of local monopoly and thus some freedom to set the price of their loans, all DFIs are
price-takers in the investment market. If a DFI could get a higher return on
investments without more risk, then presumably it would have already done so.
Furthermore, the mission of a DFI is not to invest in non-loan assets but rather to lend
to a target group.
In general, a DFI can decrease social cost via any increased revenue or decreased
expense, so it is indeed useful to compare subsidy not just with revenue from loans but
also with other items of revenue and expense. But the biggest, most malleable item is
revenue from lending, and lending is the prime purpose of a DFI. All DFIs do invest in
order to maintain some liquidity cushion to be prepared to meet demand from clients
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for loans and withdrawals of deposits, but investment is not the main line of business
of a DFI.
The numerator of both the SDR and the SDI is subsidy S. The denominator of
the SDI is revenue from lending, while the denominator of the SDR is revenue both
from lending and from investment. Thus, the SDR is always less than or equal to the
SDI. In almost all cases, the need to maintain some liquidity means that investments
are non-zero, and so the SDR makes a DFI look less subsidy-dependent than the SDI.
If investments are large compared with loans—as is the case in some years for some of
the DFIs studied by Khandker et al.—then the SDR is a lot less than the SDI. This
misleads since the DFI cannot increase the return on its investments at will and since a
DFI lives to lend.
For example, the SDR gives an unfair assessment of Grameen Bank, probably
the best-known DFI in the world (Yaron, Benjamin, and Piprek, 1997, p. 146):
[The SDR] results in an understatement of Grameen’s dependence on
subsidies, particularly during its initial years of operation, when a larger
share of its financial resources was invested in the capital market. The
measure therefore also underestimates the subsequent progress Grameen
made in reducing its dependence on subsidies as the share of funds
invested in the capital market declined relative to the share of funds
loaned to clients. Following [the logic of the SDR], a microfinance
institution could appear increasingly independent of subsidies simply by
reducing its loans outstanding.
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3.1.2 How is the SDR motivated?
KK&K justify the SDR as follows (1995, p. 46):
As part of a prudent risk-reducing policy, a financial institution may
diversify its financial resources to maximize expected return and profit.
This needs to be taken into account while calculating the SDI. Otherwise,
even if everything else remains the same, a portfolio mix can yield a
higher profit for a program that diversifies resources compared to a
program that only lends, and consequently, [the] SDI differs by program.
While it is true that more loans may mean more losses if the rush to lend more
leads to more default, the claim of KK&K is specious on three counts. First, the fact
that the SDI differs across DFIs is not a weakness but a strength. A measure that did
not differ would be useless. Second, the SDI does indeed account for the diversification
of assets since subsidy S in the numerator includes profit and thus, by definition, all
revenues from all sources, including revenue from investments. Third, if the
denominator should include revenue both from lending and from investment, then the
same logic would dictate that it also include all other types of revenues and expenses,
that is, profit. Low profits would render the SDR very high, and negative profits would
render it meaningless.
KK&K also offer a second motivation of the SDR (1995, p. 47):
To the extent that a program always minimizes its income risk through
portfolio diversification, the SDR appears more consistent than the SDI
with such a practice, and consequently is subject to less variation over
time and across programs.
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We debunk this claim on two counts. First, few DFIs minimize income risk.
Indeed, KK&K say that DFIs “maximize expected return and profit” (p. 46), which
would require anything but to minimize risk. Second, variation in how funds are split
between investment and lending over time and across programs has the same effect on
the numerator of both the SDR and the SDI. The fact that the denominator of the SDR
is always greater than or equal to the denominator of the SDI means that the SDR will
be less than or equal than the SDI. While this does indeed imply that the SDR has less
variation than the SDI, the reduced sensitivity also means that the SDR is less useful
as a tool to assess performance since it dampens differences.
Finally, KK&K claim that the SDI prescribes higher yields on lending as the
only way to reduce subsidy dependence. This is simply not true (Yaron, 1992a and
1992b). Increased yields on lending may indeed often be the easiest, quickest, and most
practical way to decrease subsidy dependence, but a strong DFI that pursues efficiency
will also use economies of scale through growth, high recuperation, decreases in
operating costs, and increases in deposit mobilization. For the example DFI and for the
sample of DFIs in Benjamin (1994), subsidy independence resulted not so much from
increased interest rates as from improved efficiency with age and growth.
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3.1.3 What is the SDR for the example DFI?
The SDR has the same numerator as the SDI but a bigger denominator:

SDR01 '
'

m @ E % A @ ( m ! c) % K !P
,
LP@ i % I@ j
0.10 @ 1,100 % 200 @ ( 0.10 ! 0.05) %500 !200
,
1,050@ 0.40 % 100@ 0.05

(19)

' 420 /425 Ñ0.988 .
The SDI was 420/420=1.00 (line Cx of Table 4 on page 39), so the SDR is less
than the SDI. The SDI says that the example DFI could be subsidy-independent if the
yield on lending increased by 100 percent. In contrast, the SDR says that the example
DFI could be subsidy-independent if the yields both on lending and on investment
increased by 99 percent. Most DFIs are price makers for their loans and price takers for
their investments. Thus a DFI could probably increase the yield on lending but not the
yield on investments.
To see how the SDR misleads, suppose that the example DFI got an extra direct
grant DG of 1,000 at the start of Year 01 and invested all of it at a yield j of 5 percent.
We make the strong assumption that the new direct grant does not increase expenses.
Accounting profits grow by 1,000@0.05=50. Average equity grows by 1,025, the 1,000
granted at the start of the year plus half of 50, the extra profit from the investment in
the course of the year. The DFI used more public funds but did not produce any more
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development finance. The SDI increases by 0.13, from 1.00 to 1.13:

SDI )01 '
'

m @ E % A @ ( m ! c) %K !P
,
LP@ i
0.10 @ ( 1,100 % 1,025) % 200 @ ( 0.10 ! 0.05) %500 ! ( 200 % 50)
,
1,050 @ 0.40

(20)

' 472.5 /420 Ñ 1.13 .
The SDR, in contrast, increases just 0.007, from 0.988 to 0.995:
SDR )01 '
'

m @ E% A @ (m ! c )% K ! P
,
LP @ i % I @ j
0.10 @ (1,100 % 1,025 )% 200@ (0.10 !0.05 )% 500! (200 % 50 )
,
1,050 @ 0.40 %( 100 % 1,000) @ 0.05

(21)

' 472.5/ 475 Ñ 0.995.
Social cost increased from 420 to 472.5, and the DFI produced the same amount
of development finance. How has the performance of the DFI changed? The SDI
suggests that performance worsened a lot. In contrast, the SDR suggests that
performance barely changed.
If (m!j)/j is less than the SDR, then investments of extra direct grants will
decrease the SDR even though subsidy dependence increases. In the example above,
m=0.10, j=0.05, so the investment of extra direct grants increased the SDR slightly
since (0.10!0.05)/0.05 = 1 > SDR Ñ 0.988. But it is not uncommon to find (m!j)/j <
SDR. For example, if the return on investments j increased from 0.05 to 0.06, then
(0.10!0.06)/0.06 Ñ 0.667 < SDR Ñ 0.988. An investment of extra direct grants still
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causes the SDI to increase, from 1.00 to 1.10:

SDI ))01 '
'

m @ E% A @ (m ! c )% K ! P
,
LP @ i
0.10 @ (1,100 % 1,030 )% 200@ (0.10 !0.05 )% 500! (200 % 60 )
,
1,050@ 0.40

(22)

' 463/ 420 Ñ 1.10.
The SDR, however, decreases, from 0.988 to 0.953:
SDR ))01 '
'

m @ E % A @ ( m ! c) % K ! P
,
LP@ i % I@ j
0.10 @ ( 1,100 % 1,030) %200 @ ( 0.10 ! 0.05) % 500 !( 200 % 60)
,
1,050@ 0.40 % (100 % 1,000 )@ 0.06

(23)

' 463 /486 Ñ0.953 .
The investment of extra subsidized funds increased social cost from 420 to 463.
The SDI increased to reflect this, but the SDR, in stark contrast, decreased. The SDR
claims that subsidy dependence decreased even though more public resources were used
to produce the same number of loans and the same value of loans outstanding with the
target group. Hence the SDR misleads and should not be used to measure of subsidy
dependence.

3.2 The Profitability Gap of Sacay
Four concerns prompted Sacay (1996) to propose the Profitability Gap (PG) as
an alternative to the SDI. First, Sacay wanted to compare subsidy with the equity of
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the DFI. Second, Sacay wanted to account for the subsidies implicit when a
government allows a DFI to fall below minimum legal standards for capital adequacy.
Third, Sacay said that the SDI is insensitive to the rate paid on public debt c. Fourth,
Sacay said that the SDI assumes that subsidy can be decreased only by increases in the
yield on lending.
These concerns are unfounded (Belli, 1996). First, the SDI is already equivalent
to an SAROE. Second, most DFIs meet legal capital requirements. For those DFIs that
do not, the PG proposed by Sacay counts some subsidies twice. Third, both the SDI
and the PG are sensitive to c. Fourth, the SDI does not claim that the only way to
remove subsidy is to increase the yield on lending.
3.2.1 What question does the PG answer?
The PG answers the question: How far from a target SAROE is a DFI that gets
subsidies from an exemption from legal capital standards? The meta-question is
whether this a useful question.
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Given a target SAROE of m, which for Sacay may or may not be an opportunity
cost from any point of view, the PG is:

PG ' m !

P! A @ (m !c )! max ( 0, E min ! E)
E % max (0, E min !E )

,

(24)

where E min is the minimum equity required by law and

max ( 0, E

min

! E) '

0 if 0 $ E min ! E,
E min !E if E min ! E> 0.

Sacay calls max(0, E min!E) the capital deficiency. If capital exceeds the legal
minimum, then the legal capital deficiency is zero. Otherwise, the deficiency is the legal
minimum less actual equity.
With no capital deficiency, E min!E#0 and so max(0, E min!E)=0. The PG is then:
PGNo deficiency ' m !

P! A @ (m !c )! 0
,
E %0

E@ m % A @ (m ! c )! P
.
'
E

(25)

The numerator of the PG with no capital deficiency, except for the lack of K, is
the same as subsidy S in the SDI formula. Without K, donors could force the PG as
low as they like with profit grants (Schreiner and Yaron, 1998). We adjust the PG to
prevent this:
PG )No deficiency '

E@ m % A @ (m !c )% K ! P
S
' .
E
E
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(26)

With no capital deficiency, the PG compares subsidy S with equity rather than
with revenue from lending. Just like the SDI, the PG is negative if and only if a
subsidy-adjusted ROE exceeds the opportunity cost m:

PG # 0 ]

m @ E ! TP
TP
.
# 0 ] m @ E !TP # 0 ] m @ E # TP ] m #
E
E

(27)

For a DFI with a capital deficiency, the PG proposed by Sacay is:
)
PGDeficiency Sacay

' m!
'

P ! A @ ( m ! c) !K !( E min ! E)
E% (E min !E )

,

E min @ m % A @ ( m ! c) % K ![ P! (E min !E )]
E min

(28)
.

The PG proposed by Sacay would adjust capital up to its legal minimum, taking
the needed capital from profit. This profit is then not available to compensate for
subsidies. While it does make sense to charge an opportunity cost m against the full
minimum capital requirement Emin, it does not make sense to take Emin!E from profit P.
In effect, the PG proposed by Sacay imputes a social cost of 1+m for each dollar of
capital deficiency. Sacay suggests that society somehow loses more than a dollar when
a DFI uses a dollar of public funds for a period. In fact, all forms of subsidized funds
have an opportunity cost of m, even those subsidized funds from exemption from
minimum-capital requirements. Thus the correct PG with capital deficiency should just
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replace E with Emin:
)

PGdeficiency '

E min @ m % A @ (m !c )% K ! P
E min

.

(29)

None of the six example DFIs in Sacay (1996) had capital deficiencies. Whether
the level of capital is adequate or deficient, the social opportunity cost of funds used by
a DFI should be adjusted to reflect the risk due to its leverage (Benjamin, 1994).
3.2.2 Sensitivity to the rate paid on public debt c
Sacay says that the PG—but not the SDI—is sensitive to changes in the rate
paid on public debt c. This is an odd claim, since both the PG and the SDI use the
same measure of subsidy. In fact, as long as subsidy S uses annual average equity E
and not start equity E0, then both the PG and the SDI do depend on c (equation 11 on
page 9):
S ' m @ E0 % (m /2 )@ [ DG %PC %RG %A@ (m !c )% DX % TP] ! TP .

(30)

Since true profit TP depends on A@m, not A@c, subsidy decreases as c increases:
MS
' !A @ (m /2 ).
Mc

(31)

This makes sense; all else constant, a DFI that pays more for public debt gets a
smaller discount on public debt and so fewer subsidized funds enter net worth. For the
example DFI, S was 420 when c was 0.05 (lines Cj and Cq of Table 4 on page 39). If c
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increases to 10 percent, then subsidy S decreases from 420 to 419.5:
S ' m @ E0 %( m / 2) @ [ DG% PC% RG % A@ ( m ! c) %DX %TP ] ! TP,
' 0.10 @ 0 %( 0.10/ 2) @ [ 1,700 % 300 % 400% 200 @ (0.10 ! 0.10 )% 100% (&310 )] !( &310) ,
' 0.05 @ 2,190 % 310 ,

(32)

' 419.5.
3.2.3 Decreased subsidy dependence through an increased yield on lending
In contrast to the claims of Sacay (1996), the SDI does not assume that an
increased yield on lending is the only way to decrease subsidy dependence. Among a
host of factors, the SDI depends on loan recuperation, deposit mobilization, and
administrative costs. The classic statement of the SDI repeatedly insists that a DFI can
decrease its subsidy dependence in many ways (Yaron, 1992b, pp. 5, 7, 23).

3.3 The average SDI of Hulme and Mosley
Two important works compute four-year averages of SDIs for ten DFIs around
the world (Mosley and Hulme, 1998; Hulme and Mosley, 1996, p. 44). The wider results
of these works depend on the computed average SDIs since they help to determine
which DFIs are analyzed as ones with a focus on growth and sustainability.
The average SDIs computed by Hulme and Mosley have two problems. First,
their formula for the average SDI destroys its interpretation as the percentage increase
in revenue that would make subsidy zero. Second, the formula used for the one-year
SDI does not seem meaningful.
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3.3.1 The ratio of averages and the average of ratios
The ratio of averages is not the same as the average of ratios:
a% b
2

a b
%
c d
.
2

…

c% d
2

(33)

The SDI is a ratio. Hulme and Mosley computed the average SDI as the average
of ratios, the right-hand side of equation 33. But just the ratio of averages—the lefthand side of equation 33—keeps the meaning of the SDI as the percentage increase in
lending that, all else constant, would make the sum of subsidy through the years zero.
For the first two years of the example DFI, the average SDI computed as the
average of ratios (right-hand side of equation 33 on page 31) is:

a b
%
c d
2

S1
'

LP1 @ i1

%

S2
LP2 @ i2

2

'

420
540
%
420 1,080
2

' 0.75.

(34)

A 75-percent increase in the yield on lending would increase profit in the first
year by 0.75@420=315. Using start equity E0 and not average equity E, this leaves a
subsidy of 420!315=105. In the second year, profits would increase by 0.75@1,080=810.
This leaves a subsidy of 540!810=!270. The sum of subsidy in the two years is not
zero but rather 105!270=!165.
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In contrast, the ratio of averages (left-hand side of equation 33 on page 31) is:
a% b
2
c% d
2

'

S1 % S2
LP1 @ i1 % LP2 @ i2

'

420 % 540
' 0.64.
420% 1,080

(35)

A 64-percent increase in the yield on lending would increase profit in the first
year by 0.64@420=268.8. Using start equity E0 and not average equity E, this leaves a
subsidy of 420!268.8=151.2. In the second year, profits would increase by
0.64@1,080=691.2. This leaves a subsidy of 540!691.2=!151.2. The sum of subsidy in
the two years is now zero.
In any case, the SDI should not be averaged across years since it is meaningful
just in short time frames. In long time frames, a full picture of subsidy dependence
requires a measure that discounts flows by when they take place in time (Schreiner,
1997). If, as in Hulme and Mosley, the SDI is averaged through a long time frame
anyway, then the analyst should divide the sum of subsidy in all years by the sum of
revenue from lending in all years. This would preserve the common interpretation of
the SDI.
3.3.2 The loan portfolio LP as a proxy for public debt A
Public debt A is a liability of a DFI, and the loan portfolio LP is an asset. In
general, there is no good reason why the two should be equal, and they rarely are.
Hulme and Mosley (1996, p. 92), however, report a formula to measure subsidy
dependence that replaces A with LP. Subsidy for Hulme and Mosley (SHM) also
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changes the expression (m!c) in the discount on public debt to (c!m):

SHM '

m @ E% LP@ (c !m )% K ! P
.
LP@ i

(36)

These amendments might be typographical errors. In later work, Mosley and
Hulme (1998, p. 789) write out the standard SDI formula, although they do not
explicitly say that this is the formula that they used in their work. Hulme and Mosley
have not responded to repeated written requests for clarification.
We cannot follow the logic that supports the formula reported in Hulme and
Mosley (1996). The switch of c and m would make the discount on public debt
negative. In our view, it also does not make sense to replace public debt A with the
loan portfolio LP. The social opportunity cost should be charged against the public
funds used by a DFI, not against the funds loaned by a DFI to the target group.
Otherwise, a DFI that did not lend would have less subsidy than one that did lend.
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4. Conclusion
We have presented the Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI) of Yaron (1992a and
1992b), shown its economic logic, and proven its equivalence to a subsidy-adjusted
ROE. We have also argued that three recent proposals do not improve on the SDI as a
measure of social cost or of subsidy dependence. In fact, each new adjustment has
weaknesses that make it less useful than the SDI.
The Subsidy Dependence Ratio (SDR) of Khandker ignores the mission of a DFI
and ignores that a DFI is a price-taker on non-loan investments. The SDR makes a
DFI appear to be closer to subsidy independence than it is. The SDR can show
decreased subsidy dependence even as a DFI uses more and more public funds to
maintain the same number of loans and value of loan portfolio for the target group.
Such illusions do not help to choose the best way to allot scarce public funds among
different projects so as to improve the welfare of the poor in the best way. As proposed
by Sacay, the Profitability Gap (PG) doubele-counts any subsidies from exemption
from minimum-capital requirements. As corrected here, the PG is equivalent to an
SAROE and thus provides no new information not already in the SDI. Finally, the
average SDI of Hulme and Mosley has an unknown interpretation since it muddles the
formula for subsidy dependence and since it takes average of ratios instead of the ratio
of averages. For all three attempts to adjust the SDI, what is good is not new, and
what is new is not good.
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The SDI measures the social cost of subsidized DFIs. The purpose of the
measurement of social cost is not to purge subsidies but rather to help donors and
governments to make informed choices about the best way to spend scarce public funds
earmarked to help the poor. Disciplined use of the SDI cannot but help to improve how
funds are spent.
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Type

Notation

Type of grant

1. Direct grant

DG

Equity grant (EG)

2. Paid-in capital

PC

3. Revenue grant

RG

4. Discount on public debt

A@(m!c)

5. Discount on expenses

DX

6. True profit

TP

Table 1: Types of subsidized funds
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Profit grant (PG)

Equity grant (EG)

Line
Aa
Ab
Ac
Ad
Ae
Af
Ag

As of
Assets
Cash
Data
Loan portfolio (gross)
Data
Reserve for loan losses
Data
Loan Portfolio (net), LP Ab+Ac
Investments, I
Data
Fixed assets (net)
Data
Total assets
Aa+Ad+Ae+Af

Ah
Ai
Aj
Ak

Liabilities
Deposit libs.
Private debt
Public debt, A
Total liabilities

12/31/00 12/31/01 12/31/02 12/31/03

Data
Data
Data
Ah+Ai+Aj

Equity
Al Paid-in capital, PC
Data
Am Direct grants, DG
Data
An Retained earnings
An(t-1)+Bm
Total equity
Ao
Al+Am+An
Total equity and libs. Ak+Ao
Ap
Source: Example of authors. Money figures in constant units.

Table 2: Balance sheet
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0
0
0
0
0
0
0

600
2,100
0
2,100
200
100
3,000

700
3,300
0
3,300
400
200
4,600

800
5,200
0
5,200
600
200
6,800

0
0
0
0

200
200
400
800

400
300
800
1,500

600
400
1,200
2,200

0
0
0
0
0

300
1,700
200
2,200
3,000

645
2,000
455
3,100
4,600

910
2,300
1,390
4,600
6,800

Line
For the year ending
Ba Rev. from lending, LP*i
Data
Bb Rev. investments, I*j
Data
Total rev. operations
Bc
Ba+Bb

12/31/00 12/31/01 12/31/02 12/31/03
0
420
1,080
1,700
0
5
15
25
0
425
1,095
1,725

Bd
Be
Bf
Bg
Bh

Exp. int. deposit libs.
Exp. int. private debt
Exp. int. public debt, A*c
Total int. exp.
Financial margin

Data
Data
Data
Bd+Be+Bf
Bc-Bg

0
0
0
0
0

5
10
10
25
400

15
25
30
70
1,025

25
35
50
110
1,615

Bi
Bj
Bk
Bl
Bm

Exp. prov. reserve for loan loss
Exp. admin.
Operating margin
Rev. grants, RG
Accounting profit, P

Data
Data
Bh-(Bi+Bj)
Data
Bk+Bl

0
0
0
0
0

0
600
(200)
400
200

0
1,170
(145)
400
255

0
1,080
535
400
935

0

100

100

Memo item:
Bn Discounts on expenses, DX
Data
Source: Example of authors. Money figures in constant units.

Table 3: Income statement
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100

Line
Ca Start equity
Cb End equity
Ave. equity, E
Cc

For the year ending
Al(t-1)+Am(t-1)+An(t-1)
Al+Am+An
(Ca+Cb)/2

12/31/00 12/31/01 12/31/02 12/31/03
0
2,200
3,100
2,200
3,100
4,600
1,100
2,650
3,850

Cd
Ce

Opp. cost of society, m
Subsidy on equity, E*m

Data
Cc*Cd

0.10
110

0.10
265

0.10
385

Cf
Cg
Ch

Start public debt
End public debt
Ave. public debt, A

Aj(t-1)
Aj
(Cf+Cg)/2

0
400
200

400
800
600

800
1,200
1,000

Ci
Cj

Exp. int. public debt, A*c
Rate paid public debt, c

Bf
Ci/Ch

10
0.05

30
0.05

50
0.05

Ck
Cl

Opp. cost public debt, m
Disc. public debt, A*(m-c)

Data
Ch*(Ck-Cj)

0.10
10

0.10
30

0.10
50

Cm Rev. grants, RG
Cn Discounts on expenses, DX
K
Co

Bl
Bn
Cm+Cn

400
100
500

400
100
500

400
100
500

Cp
Cq

Accounting profit, P
Subsidy, S

Bm
Ce+Cl+Co-Cp

200
420

255
540

935
0

Cr
Cs
Ct

Start loan portfolio (net)
End loan portfolio (net)
Ave. loan port. (net), LP

Ad(t-1)
Ad
(Cr+Cs)/2

0
2,100
1,050

2,100
3,300
2,700

3,300
5,200
4,250

Cu
Cv

Rev. from lending, LP*i
Yield on lending, i

Ba
Cu/Ct

420
0.40

1,080
0.40

1,700
0.40

Cw

Rev. from lending, LP*i

Ct*Cv

420

1,080

1,700

Cx

Subsidy Dependence Index, SDI Cq/Cw

1.00

0.50

0.00

0.40
0.40
0.80
0.10
0.64

0.40
0.20
0.60
0.10
0.45

0.40
0.00
0.40
0.10
0.27

Cy Yield on lending, i
Cz Change in yield
Nominal subsidy-free yield
Caa
Cbb Inflation
Real subsidy-free yield
Ccc
Source: Example of authors. Money figures

Cv
Cy*Cx
Cy+Cz
Data
(Caa-Cbb)/(1+Cbb)
in constant units.

Table 4: Subsidy Dependence Index
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Line
Da
Db
Dc
Dd
De

For
Accounting profit, P
Rev. grants, RG
Discount public debt, A*(m-c)
Discounts on expenses, DX
True profit, TP

the year ending 12/31/00 12/31/01 12/31/02 12/31/03
Bm
200
255
935
Bl
400
400
400
Cl
10
30
50
Bn
100
100
100
Da-(Db+Dc+Dd)
(310)
(275)
385

Df
Dg
Dh

Start equity
End equity
Ave. equity, E

Ao(t-1)
Ao
(Df+Dg)/2

0
2,200
1,100

2,200
3,100
2,650

3,100
4,600
3,850

Di
Dj
Dk

Start assets
End assets
Ave. assets

Ag(t-1)
Ag
(Di+Dj)/2

0
3,000
1,500

3,000
4,600
3,800

4,600
6,800
5,700

Da/Dk
De/Dk

0.13
(0.21)

0.07
(0.07)

0.16
0.07

0.18
(0.28)

0.10
(0.10)

0.24
0.10

Dl ROA
Dm Subsidy-adjusted ROA

Dn ROE
Da/Dh
Do Subsidy-adjusted ROE
De/Dh
Source: Example of authors. Money figures in constant units.

Table 5: Subsidy-adjusted ROE and subsidy-adjusted ROA
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